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所在平台: Coursera |
课程主页: https://www.coursera.org/learn/property-law-and-economics
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课程名称：财产与责任：法律与经济学导论 课程概述：在这门课程中，您将以一种新颖的方式思考美国法律中最古老和最熟悉的原则——财产和比例责任，并学习如何将经济学推理应用于生活中一个特别重要且引人注目的方面。 课程大纲： 第一部分：财产 财产是法律与经济学的交汇点，但并不是一个简单的概念。财产不是物体或人和物体之间的关系，而是一组权利，人们之间关于谁应控制物体的多种用途的关系。不同的人可能同时控制物体的不同用途，或者在不同的时间控制物体的相同用途。新用途的出现可能导致争议，法律必须定义新财产权并最初分配给某一方以解决争端。一旦争议解决，前争吵者可以在彼此之间交易这些权利，意外的结果会随之产生。 第二部分：交换与效率 自愿交换意味着互惠互利——人们在交易财产权时，是因为他们各自相信从交易中获得的东西对他们来说比放弃的东西更有价值。当自愿交换没有障碍时，财产权会最终落入最看重这些权利的人手中，这是经济学家所称的权利的有效配置。课程将探讨当存在障碍时，法律如何在实现有效配置方面发挥作用，或者是否应该在分配财产权时追求其他价值，而不仅仅是有效配置。 第三部分：外部性 交换既涉及收益也涉及成本——交易者从他人那里取得权利，给他人带来成本但为自己创造利益。外部成本是指一人未付费拿走他人的权利，这导致拿权人获取超过有效配置所允许的权利，同时受害者未得到赔偿。法律对此的回应是责任，迫使那些未付费拿走权利的人赔偿那些失去权利的人的成本。 第四部分：犯罪与惩罚 某些外部性涉及少数未得到赔偿的权利损失者，其成本以货币计算相对简单，强制拿权者向受害者支付这些成本确保受害者获得公正赔偿。法律将这些外部性称为侵权行为，类似的责任定价原理也适用于犯罪，犯罪涉及同时剥夺许多人的权利，且道德成本无法用金钱衡量。 第五部分：财产、效用与技术 财产概念向两个新方向发展。一个方向涉及征收的公共利益及其对个人权利的保护，另一个方向探讨如何在技术使人们轻易地无补偿获取他人财产权的情况下组织自愿交换。如果现有权利不足以防止这种现象，需要新型财产权鼓励有效的生产和交换。课程将以知识产权为例，探讨新的财产形式如何促进思想的交流。 第六部分：刑事程序 刑事责任意味着犯罪有价格，如何从未付费的权利拿权者身上收取这些价格是刑事程序面临的问题。全球范围内，针对有罪的判断和惩罚已经演变出了两大主要体系：对抗性和探究性，二者在评估有罪与惩罚的程序上存在差异，各自体现了对真相和公平的不同承诺。各种程序都需要费用，各国政府必须以有限的资源应对庞大的案卷处理问题，这导致了欧洲的探究性与英美的对抗性系统之间产生新的裁判程序，逐渐缩小了两者的差距。
Part: 1
Title:Property
Description:Property is where law and economics meet, but it's not a simple concept. Property is not an object or a relation between people and objects, but a set of rights, relations among people over who is to control each of the many uses to which objects can be put. Different people may control different uses of an object, that is, have different property rights over its various uses, at the same time, or control the same use of the object at different times. When new uses create disputes, the law must define new property rights and allocate them initially to resolve the dispute – someone must be deemed to have won the dispute and be given initial ownership of the new rights. But once the former disputants are allowed to trade these rights among themselves, surprising results follow.
Part: 2
Title:Exchange and Efficiency
Description:Voluntary exchange implies mutual benefit – when people trade property rights, it's because they each believe that what they get from the trade will be more valuable to them than what they have to give up to get it. So if there are no obstacles to voluntary exchange, that is, if transaction costs are low, property rights will end up in the hands of the person who values them the most, a result economists call an efficient allocation of the rights. What happens when there are barriers that impede or prevent property rights from reaching their highest valuing owner through exchange? Can the law assign property rights to achieve efficient allocation in such cases? Should it try, or are there values other than efficient allocation the law might try to advance, along with or instead of efficient allocation, in assigning property rights?
Part: 3
Title:Externality
Description:Exchange involves both benefit and cost – traders take rights from others, imposing costs on them but creating benefit for themselves, but they must compensate the others for their costs by paying for the rights they've taken. External costs are imposed when one person takes another's rights without paying for them, which leads to the taker taking more rights than efficient allocation would allow and leaves the victim uncompensated for the costs of losing the rights. The law's response to this inefficiency and injustice is liability, forcing those who take rights without payment to compensate those whose rights they have taken for the costs they have borne. Thinking about how the law determines these liability prices, and how people might respond to them, reveals the underlying economic logic of liability.
Part: 4
Title:Crime and Punishment
Description:Some externalities involve only a few uncompensated losers of rights whose costs are easily reckoned in monetary terms, so that forcing the taker to pay exactly these costs to the victims ensures both that victims will be fairly compensated and that takers will take rights only where they value the rights more than the losers do. The law calls these externalities torts, and the same principle of liability pricing extends to crimes, in which, with the same unlawful act, someone simultaneously takes the rights of many people who suffer moral costs that can't be satisfactorily measured by money. As with torts, some crimes may be efficient reallocations of rights, and the logic of liability shows that proportional punishment can, ideally, discover which crimes are or are not efficient and force all takers to compensate their victims in full for what they take.
Part: 5
Title:Property, Utility and Technology
Description:The concept of property is developed in two new directions. One concerns the problem of eminent domain and evokes the ancient conflict between individual rights and collective needs – in what circumstances, and to what extent, should private property be protected against uncompensated taking by government? How do the different theories of property considered earlier each answer this question? The other asks how voluntary exchange can be organized when technology makes it easy for people to take others' property rights without compensation. If existing rights are insufficient to prevent these takings from occurring on a large enough scale to make voluntary exchange impossible, new kinds of property rights are needed to encourage efficient levels of production and exchange. This is illustrated by the problem of intellectual goods and the new forms of property that have evolved over centuries to make exchange in ideas possible.
Part: 6
Title:Criminal Procedure
Description:Criminal liability means that crimes have prices, and how these prices are exacted in practice from people who take rights without compensation is the problem of criminal procedure. How do judges know who is guilty, and what prices guilty people should be made to pay for their crimes? Around the world, two major systems of adjudicating guilt and punishment, the adversarial and the inquisitorial, have evolved over centuries to answer these questions in individual cases, with very different procedures to assess guilt and punishment that express different commitments to truth and fairness. All these procedures are expensive, and governments everywhere must confront the problem of processing large caseloads with limited resources. This has led the inquisitorial systems of Europe and the adversarial systems of England and the United States to new procedures of adjudication that may be reducing the differences between them.
Think about the oldest and most familiar principles of American law, property and proportional liability, in a new and surprising way, and learn to apply economic reasoning to an especially important and interesting aspect of life.
